Let the Mullahs Go Nuke

The way to peace in the Middle East may lie in facilitating Iran's nuclear ambitions.

The prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran seems to make a lot of people upset. Last week, German Chancellor Angela Merkel paid a visit to the US and told Congress that Iran's nuclear program is “against the interests of the German people”. President Obama, despite his promises of cautious diplomacy, has repeatedly warned the regime against acquiring a nuclear weapon. Meanwhile the Israeli's are not discounting the option of a military strike against what it sees as a threat to its national security.

The international reaction towards Iranian nuclear effort is understandable. This is after all a country headed by a president who had once proclaimed his wish to see Israel “wiped of the map”. Anyone who has seen images of the devastation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki would certainly agree with the wisdom that a nuclear-armed Iran is not exactly a desirable element towards achieving peace in the Middle East.

But this “wisdom” may have been proven to be fundamentally flawed by a very important historical precedent often ignored by nuclear pessimists: since the existence of nuclear weapons, there has never been a war between two states that are mutually armed with it.

In the discourse of nuclear proliferation and the imminent destruction that it's supposed to unleash upon the world, people seemed to have forgotten just effectively nuclear deterrence has worked over the past six decades. Ever since the last nuclear weapon was unleashed upon Nagasaki in 1945, mankind has witnessed an unprecedented stretch of peace that has not existed in recent history. It took just 21 years for a second world war to follow the first. The fact that there has never been a third, or a similar catastrophe where millions of lives are lost within a matter of years, may be sufficient testament to the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence in ensuring the peace that we enjoy today.

This prolonged period of peace is largely possible because nuclear weapons have changed the dynamics of international diplomacy. Professor Kenneth Waltz, Emeritus Professor at UC Berkley and prominent scholar of international relations, calls this phenomenon “dissuasion by deterrence”. The prospect of assured mutual destruction has prevented nuclear armed states from ever escalating a conflict to the brink of a full scale war.

For example, during a brief skirmish in 1999 between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, observers keenly noted how both countries were careful to ensure that the the actions of their military were mellow at most, each country avoiding strikes that would inflict serious damage onto vital infrastructures of the other. Both were aware of what the consequences could be should they fail to exercise restrain in their military operations.

Another case in point for “dissuasion by deterrence” is the 1962 Missile Crisis. President Kennedy took the then unprecedented risk of agreeing to remove all missiles in southern Italy and Turkey in return for the Soviet's agreement to vacate Cuba. Such concessions would not have been possible should either one of these nations had been the unipolar power of its time.

“Dissuasion by deterrence” may have proven its compelling case over the decades. But what about the contemporary personalities we have today? Should we not be worried about the eccentrics demonstrated by heads of state such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Kim Jong Il? Surely, putting a nuclear weapon in the hands of a man who wants to wipe an entire country of the map is detrimental towards the well being of mankind?

The fact of the matter is, we have in the past inadvertently trusted nuclear weapons in the hands of personalities that were way more worrisome than demented communists or deranged Persians. Remember, both Chairman Mao of China and Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union once threatened to unleash their nuclear weapons upon the United States at some point of time during the cold war. But as murderous as the comments were, these leaders still had the common sense to realize that no country can walk truly walk away from a nuclear war. As political commentator Jonathan Tepperman observed, “all states are rational at some basic level” no matter how delirious their leaders may seem.

Having argued for peace by nuclear weapons, what then should the international approach be towards the nuclear ambitions of regimes such as North Korea and Iran? The key lies in 3 advancement thrusts: advancement of nuclear forensics, advancement of nuclear expertise and the advancement of a nuclear community.

Advancement of Nuclear Forensics.

Pioneered by Harvard University's Professor Graham Allison, nuclear forensics is an emerging field which allows scientists to trace any nuclear device, detonated or otherwise, back to its owner and manufacturer. No two nuclear weapons are alike and each will have its own unique radioactive signature. The advancement of nuclear forensics will act as an insurance to deter states from selling their nuclear weapons to rogue elements or detonating their nuclear devices via a proxy, knowing that these can very well be traced to its origin, with its originator facing the consequences. Nuclear forensics has consequentially given us the ability to ensure that nuclear states remain responsible for their respective stockpiles. The international community needs to dedicate more political will and resources to the advancement of this field.

Advancement of Nuclear Expertise

Unlike what has been often portrayed in the movies, nuclear weapons are seldom activated by pushing a “red button”. The firing mechanisms for these devices are intricately complex, needing several levels of instituted protocols and procedures before the weapon has the ability to go “live”. Countries such as the United States need to ensure that nuclear technical expertise are inculcated amongst state players to ensure that the worldwide nuclear stockpile continue to retain sophisticated firing mechanisms and procedures to prevent them from falling to rogue elements.

But more importantly, nuclear experts must propagate what Tepperman calls “survivable second strike option”. This is the ability for a nation to bounce back from a nuclear strike and retaliate with its own nuclear arsenal. Once this ability is attained by all nuclear powers, no nation will risk hitting another with a nuclear weapon, knowing that retaliation is inevitable.

Advancement of Nuclear Community

“Dissuasion by Deterrence” can effectively work only if every nation in the world knows for sure exactly who the nuclear powers are. While there already exists an intergovernmental forum for nuclear powers in the form of the IAEA, the platform has systematically excluded by proxy, states that it deems to be unsuitable to be nuclear armed. A truly inclusive platform for the international community of nuclear powers will not only encourage the proliferation of nuclear know-how, but more importantly eradicate mistrust among states and discourage the possibility of clandestine armaments.

It will be tough to pitch the above measures to the international audience, let alone muster the political will to even consider them. The attempt to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons has taken up much time and resources but few have actually pondered the truth with regards to the role that nuclear deterrence has played in ensuring the peace we have today. A nuclear-armed Iran could actually spark the regional nuclear arms race in the Middle East that will be needed to bring about an equilibrium of peace in the region. Should our leaders still not acknowledge this, we may find ourselves in the future in yet another unnecessary war.

The writer is a student enrolled in the Bachelor of Islamic Revealed Knowledge at the International Islamic University & doing the Master of Science (Strategic Studies) at the Nanyang Technological University